The 5G standards (e.g. 3GPP TS 2and TS 202) stipulate that a SEPP is a mandatory function for MNO interconnect for roaming between standalone 5G cores. Following the 3GPP 5G security specifications TS 33.
What is Sepp used for? As such, the SEPP performs message filtering, policing and topology hiding for all API messages. This network function is quite similar to Diameter Agent in 4G (complemented with some NRF functionalities), which sits in the middle of the network and performs crucial functions.
You can compare its functionalities as similar to SBC (Session Border Controller) when Voice packets are routed from Core network to IMS network for VoLTE service.
A 5G signalling edge proxy is required to protect traffic crossing a security domain boundary, and thus needs to be included in the architecture. The first step standardized by 3GPP towards complete 5G coverage was Non-Standalone NR, also known as E-UTRA-NR Dual Connectivity (EN-DC) or Architecture ‘Option 3’. The key feature of Non-Standalone is the ability to utilize existing LTE and EPC infrastructure, thus making new 5G-based radio technology available without network replacement.
EN-DC uses LTE as the master radio access technology, while the new radio access technology (i.e. NR) serves as secondary radio access technology with User Equipments (UEs) connected to both radios. Except for capability negotiation, security procedures for EN-DC basically follow the specifications for dual connectivity security for 4G. G base-station, and the access rights to SgNB.
The Capability and access rights check ensures that the standard is forward compatible since UEs with different capabilities, including security capabilities,. See full list on 3gpp. Moving on from the Non-Standalone deployment, in a Standalone 5G system, the trust model has evolved.
Trust within the network is considered as decreasing the further one moves from the core. This has impact on decisions taken in 5G security design, thus we present the trust model in this section. The trust model in the UE is reasonably simple: there are two trust domains, the tamper proof universal integrated circuit card (UICC) on which the the Universal Subscriber Identity Module (USIM) resides as trust anchor and the Mobile Equipment (ME).
The ME and the USIM together form the UE. The network side trust model for roaming and non-roaming cases are shown in Figure and respectively, which shows the trust in mulitple layers, like in an onion. The DU does not have any access to customer communications as it may be deployed in unsupervis. G Phase brings several enhancements to 4G LTE security, some of the key points are presented in this section. This is similar to 4G but there are a few differences.
The authentication mechanism has in-built home control allowing the home operator to know whether the device is authenticated in a given network and to take final call of authentication. Optionally, other EAP based authentication mechanisms are also allowed in 5G – for specific cases such as private networks. Also, primary authentication is radio access technology independent, thus it can run over non-3GPP technology such as IEEE 802. Non-Standalone and 5G Phase Standalone architecture gave us a taste of the new generation of the mobile communication system.
Secondary authentication: Secondary authentica. The main use case for 5G Phase was mobile broadband. G Phase will bring solutions for the Internet of Things (IoT), covering several scenarios in the form of massive Machine Type Communication (mMTC) and Ultra-Reliable and Low Latency Communications (URLLC). MTC relates to very large number of devices transmitting a relatively low volume of non-delay-sensitive data and URLLC relates to services with stringent requirements for capabilities such as throughput, latency and availability.
For mMTC, very low data-rates going down to few bits per day, we will have to consider the extent of security (be it authentication, confidentiality, integrity or otherwise) that can be provided. Several IoT or Machine-to-Machine (M2M) services and devices fall under this category, examples are temperature sensors giving hourly updates, sensors on farm animals giving vita. Study on the security aspects of the next generation system”, Release 1 v 1.
Introduction of SEPP at PLMN border Complete rewriting of messages at before sending to IPX End-to-end integrity protection Some elements end -to-end confidentiality protected IPX changes recorded using JSON patch. Rewrite message Add JSON patch1. It can provide the SEPP , SCP, and BSF functions simply by means of software upgrade.
Security architecture and procedures for 5G system”. Reference point between SEPP in the visited network and the SEPP in the home network. The 5G stage level specifications include the overall architecture model and principles, eMBB data services, subscriber authentication and service usage authorization, application support in general, but also specifically for applications closer to the radio as with edge computing. Provides policy rules for control plane functions.
This includes network slicing, roaming and mobility management.